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UNreaSoN, LoVe, 
aND UN-BecoMINg 
QUeer
renée c. hoogland
Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the 
Foundations of Queer Theory by 
Lynne Huffer. gender and culture 
series. New York city: columbia 
University Press, 2009. Pp. 376, 10 
illustrations. $84.50 cloth, $27.50 
paper.
Mad for Foucault, Lynne Huffer’s 
recent attempt at “rethinking the 
foundations of queer theory”—as 
the book’s subtitle runs—is, in a 
way, a rather maddening read. 
Whether this is because Huffer is, 
by her own admission, madly in 
love with (her) “Foucault,” or be-
cause her main subject is Foucault’s 
first major work, The History of 
Madness, published in French in 
1961, but only fully translated into 
english and published by rout-
ledge in 2006, I am not so sure. 
Madness, as Foucault’s famous ar-
gument suggests, cannot speak it-
self; the madman is relegated to 
silence or to the outside of civiliza-
tion, and his (non)existence can 
only be spoken by the voice of 
morality, reason, and/or (medical) 
science. any discourse about mad-
ness, however humble or self- 
effacing, thus cannot but ultimately 
repeat some of the gestures of pre-
cisely the positivist production of 
the negativity of madness that it is 
Foucault’s, and in his wake, 
Huffer’s project to lay bare, and 
subvert. Hence, I find myself danc-
ing around discursive impossibili-
ties, if not aporias, that inhere in 
Foucault’s original Madness, as 
much as in the “ironic terms” of 
Huffer’s productive encounter 
with this book as “object-event” 
(x), a happening, or “coup de fou-
dre” (10), which, while starting off 
with Foucault’s question “why 
[have] we made sexuality into a 
moral experience?” (xv), gradually 
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becomes “[her] own story of love” 
(16).
as a story of love, Huffer’s book 
is as much a loving embrace of a 
newly discovered, or, better, a dis-
cursively recovered, “Foucault,” as 
it is an embrace of the archive, a 
succumbing to the “archive fever” 
that she had never experienced be-
fore she spent a month in the Fou-
cault archives in Normandy in 
2006, shortly after the “translation-
event,” the appearance in english 
of The History of Madness (here-
after, Madness). The (to an english-
speaking audience) more familiar 
title Madness and Civilization: A 
History of Insanity in the Age of Rea-
son (1965) is a translation of the 
truncated French version, an inex-
pensive paperback edition of 230 
pages (about one-third the length 
of the original), which came out 
soon after the original, and which, 
to Foucault’s apparent chagrin, be-
came the standard edition of the 
book. To complicate this erratic 
publishing history even further: a 
revised edition of the 1961 original 
appeared in French 1972, with a 
new preface by Foucault—a “mar-
velous, self-ironizing” one, in 
Huffer’s words, that stands in stark 
contrast to, and thus forms a “dis-
torting mirror” to the “overly po-
etic, ‘lyrical’ voice of the young 
Foucault” (x) that speaks the (sub-
sequently suppressed) 1961 pref-
ace. Huffer foregrounds the 
“distorting mirror” of the Fou-
cauldian archive, its double-
voicedness—Foucault, as Deleuze 
reminds us, “is haunted by the 
double and its essential otherness” 
(xii)—to build on the rupturing 
event of Madness, and embraces its 
disruptive publication history to 
testify to its “importance for our 
present post-queer age” (x). read-
ing Madness retrospectively, which, 
in the context of queer theory, and 
its almost exclusive focus on Fou-
cault’s History of Sexuality One, is 
also to read it prospectively, her 
aim is, appropriately, dual: on the 
one hand, she wants to stipulate 
the material presence of the ar-
chive, in casu, to mark the traces or 
ghosts of the historically variably 
defined “madmen”—including, but 
not restricted to, the figures of sex-
ual unreason, or queers—and, on 
the other, to “unravel some of the 
blind spots” (xi) of queer theory 
and offer a reading of Madness that 
will allow for a “political ethos of 
eros” as a practice of self-transfor-
mation as a “possibility of altera-
tion in our historical present” (261).
Huffer goes about her ambi-
tious undertaking in five, relatively 
long chapters, preceded by—per-
versely—a preface, as well as an 
introduction, interspersed with 
four “interludes,” and concluding 
with a “postlude.” each of the 
chapters takes on the larger chal-
lenge of relaunching a radical form 
of queer theory in this, our “pres-
ent post-queer age,” by a thorough 
exploration of one or more aspects 
of Madness, Foucault’s monumen-
tal, and arguably founding, narra-
tive on sexuality and ethics, the 
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urtext, so to speak, that puts both 
Sexuality One (1978) and the last 
two volumes of The History of Sex-
uality—The use of Pleasure (1984) 
and The Care of the Self (1984)—
into a significantly different light. 
The interludes serve to offer us in-
sight into the personal and pro-
fessional contexts that render/ed 
Huffer’s passionate encounter with 
“Foucault” such a deeply unset-
tling, yet enabling one; to clarify 
her urge to dislodge traditional 
thinking about one of the principal 
figures in sexuality studies, by, inter 
alia, un-coupling the “Freudo-
Foucauldian foundations” (164) of 
queer theory; and to undo the 
“performative logic” of (some of) 
its most prominent practitioners.
Huffer’s need, in the introduc-
tion, to give an “account of her-
self”—to obliquely recall the title 
of a book by one of her main criti-
cal targets, Judith Butler—and to 
explain her desire to engage with 
Foucault as a queer feminist, and as 
professor and chair of Women’s 
Studies at emory University at 
that, is not altogether surprising in 
view of Foucault’s track record as a 
gender-blind thinker. Her femi-
nist “defense” nonetheless struck 
me as somewhat laborious, and, in 
its exhaustiveness, unnecessary. 
Her thorough critique of philo-
sophical dismissals of Madness 
(most famously, by Jacques Der-
rida), in contrast—a thoroughness 
that is sustained throughout the 
subsequent chapters—almost im-
mediately persuaded me of the va-
lidity of Huffer’s chosen task (i.e., 
to “re-queer Foucault”), as well as 
of the political significance of her 
overall philosophical argument.
Huffer (re)reads Foucault’s ge-
nealogy of the “structure of the ex-
perience of madness,” which he 
himself admits is a “doubly impos-
sible task” (28) (since madness can-
not be captured nor can its truth be 
spoken), through the lens provided 
by gilles Deleuze in Foucault 
(1986), published two years after 
Foucault’s death. While Foucault 
himself insisted on his role as a 
nonhistorian and a nonphiloso-
pher, Deleuze foregrounds the 
complex relation between these 
two fields in Foucault’s concept of 
subjectivity as subjectivation, a 
conception Huffer, in her turn, 
calls “coextensive” (29). Drawing 
on the Deleuzian concept of the 
fold, she elaborates a notion of co-
extension that at once covers the 
“cartography that encompasses the 
complex relations among social, 
historical, political, linguistic, and 
conceptual fields,” and that ren-
ders the subject “coterminous, con-
tingent, or contiguous with an 
outside that is in a continual pro-
cess of transformation and expan-
sion” (31). It is this idea of 
subjectivation as an ongoing pro-
cess of becoming (other), as coter-
minous rather than produced—or 
constructed—in interaction with 
its “constitutive outside” that will 
lead Huffer through Madness, and 
that ultimately opens the way to 
the proposed “political ethic of 
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eros.” Before she, and thus we, her 
(and Foucault’s) readers, reach this 
point, however, a moment of open-
ing up to a future, she/we have a 
long and occasionally tortuous way 
to go through what at moments 
feels like a labyrinthine trek 
through a both unfolding and en-
folding discursive archive.
The historical journey of the 
subject truly begins with the pro-
duction of madness (and, impor-
tantly, of nonnormative sexualities) 
at the “moment of division be-
tween reason and its others” (40), 
the “cartesian coup of the cogito” 
(74) that produced subjectivity 
through “structures of moral ex-
clusion” (40). The next stage takes 
us, under Huffer’s erudite guid-
ance, through Nietzsche’s critique 
of morality, and especially his 
“evocation of Dionysian intoxica-
tion and nonrationality as a cre-
ative force” (87)—so palpably 
present in Foucault’s thought—
but also to the image of Nietzsche’s 
undoing, his fall into madness, 
which, rather than a romantic cel-
ebration of transgressive insanity, 
as some of Foucault’s critics would 
have it, serves to expose the “price 
exacted by rationalist moralism 
from those who resist its despotic 
order” (88). Huffer’s engagement 
with Nietzsche’s “moral subject,” 
with the production of “bad con-
science” through the “unfolding of 
the interiority of a seemingly self-
contained subject with an ‘inside,’ 
a ‘psyche,’ or a ‘soul’” (91), allows 
her both to connect the production 
of sexuality as an “inner” essence to 
the structures of rational morality 
of the classical age and further to 
evolve her critique of the Freudo-
Foucauldian link in queer theory 
and, therewith, of the model of 
sexuality in terms of performativ-
ity.
as earlier suggested, Judith 
Butler is singled out as the primary 
target of Huffer’s postqueer cri-
tique, being the “most famous, in-
deed founding example of [queer 
theory’s] performative logic” (113). 
elsewhere, she more approvingly 
refers to eve Sedgwick (praised for 
asking “paradigmatically” Fou-
cauldian questions [92]), while she 
altogether dismisses, on both po-
litical and theoretical grounds, Leo 
Bersani’s and Lee edelman’s 
“psyche-driven ‘anti-social’ thesis” 
for continuing to “assume the exis-
tence of a psyche as a container of 
the subject’s death” (115). Her cri-
tique of Butler’s performative 
model is, in my view, both sound 
and convincing, and constitutes 
one of the (many) enabling mo-
ments for my own thinking about 
being/becoming, and not only in 
terms of gender/sexuality.
Huffer readily admits that But-
ler’s reversal of the sex/gender dis-
tinction, so that the primacy of sex 
(nature) over gender (culture) is 
dismantled, is “no small feat” (113). 
She goes on to point out, however, 
that performativity’s dialectical 
logic not only reinforces the binary 
opposition between acts and iden-
tities most queer readers of Fou-
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cault have wrongly considered to 
form the center of his argument in 
Sexuality One, but also “deploys an 
apparatus of cause-effect reversal 
and sublation” (113) that differs 
from Foucault’s much more radi-
cal attempt to “do away with the 
subject altogether.” The subversive 
or parodic “resignification” of nor-
mative gender/sexual identities 
leaves the lethal power of carte-
sian rationalism, bourgeois moral-
ism, and Freudian psychoanalysis 
intact, in that it does nothing to 
undo the production of interiority, 
the internalization of morality (or, 
alternatively, of pathology) that 
condemns the (post)enlighten-
ment subject to its “caged free-
dom”; in other words, by failing to 
address the “historical problem of 
the normative internalization of 
violence” (116), queer performa-
tivity leaves intact that which 
Nietzsche, and Foucault with him, 
considered the “‘serious illness’ 
that is the psyche or the soul” (114). 
Foucauldian “desubjectivation,” in 
contrast, takes Nietzsche’s critique 
of moral interiority ultimately to a 
renegotiation of subjectivity itself, 
promising, in Huffer’s terms, 
“forms of self-transformation we 
might imagine not as expansions of 
the self but as self-unravelings.”
To be sure, Huffer is fully aware 
that “desubjectivation as becom-
ing-other” means losing oneself 
completely or, indeed, to “be stark 
raving mad” (123). But despite the 
fact that this is a “horrifying prop-
osition” (123), especially to those of 
us who have witnessed or experi-
enced such madness up close, and 
that it is, in fact, impossible to re-
ally know what “desubjectivation 
as becoming-other” means, she 
wants to maintain the possibility of 
at least trying to think, or dream, 
the self otherwise; that is, beyond 
the constituting violence of the 
cogito and the equally violent 
“Freudian coup that establishes 
paternal authority within the sov-
ereign structure of the oedipus 
complex” (153). To this end, she 
extensively explores the function 
of Denis Diderot’s Rameau’s 
Nephew, first published in 1805 in 
german translation by goethe, as, 
Huffer submits, a central text for a 
nineteenth-century Hegel and the 
French Hegelians of the twentieth 
century. Presented as a threshold 
figure of modernity, rameau’s 
nephew, “Diderot’s split subject,” 
is as required a character for Fou-
cault as he is for Huffer, in that he 
embodies a limit experience, a fig-
ure whose “aporetic irony” under-
mines the “epistemological, ethical, 
and aesthetic rationalizations of 
the enlightened subject” (200). as a 
figure of modern madness, the 
self-mocking nephew inhabits a 
heterotopian space at the heart of 
Foucault’s Madness (nine pages 
smack in the middle of the book, 
apparently, center on this “queer 
nephew”) and opens up, in Huffer’s 
project, the “possibility of . . . 
queering reason’s heteronormative 
filiations.” and this is, as suggested 
before, the core of Huffer’s attempt 
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at rereading Foucault as an ethical 
project, that is, to think (or dream) 
ethics as a question of subjectivity, 
which, it will be clear, entails, as 
much as it requires, the undoing of 
the moral subject of reason per se.
Ironically, when Huffer finally 
fully unfolds her model of a “po-
litical ethic of eros,” she moves 
away from the discourse of Mad-
ness and retroactively reads its nar-
rative of desubjectivation as a 
prelude to Foucault’s (controver-
sial) later writings on ethics in the 
ancient world, his defense of the 
care of the self, of an ethics of eros 
as a transformative rethinking of 
life. Foucault’s arts of existence, 
she maintains, should be viewed as 
a “practice of philosophy and his-
tory [that] insists on the impor-
tance of the other” (275), as 
explicitly concerned with alterity, 
an often-overlooked aspect of his 
lifelong work, which nonetheless 
prominently emerges from his 
careful attention to the traces of 
those discarded lives, the ghosts of 
history illuminated in/by his archi-
val work. antiromantic and anti-
irrational, Foucault’s ethics of eros 
is thus offered as the “intense 
thinking-feeling—an erotic curi-
osity as care—toward the wounded 
vulnerability of the beloved other” 
(277–78).
attractive, compelling, and, in-
deed, indisputably much more en-
riching and enabling than either 
anti-utopian queer discourses à la 
Bersani and edelman, or David 
Halperin’s reduction of a transfor-
mative practical ethics to queer 
sexual practices such as gay fisting, 
or, indeed, the parodic resignifica-
tion of normative gender and sex-
ual identities through performative 
subversion, I, paradoxically, find 
myself somewhat disappointed 
with this tender ending of Huffer’s 
passionate, occasionally dazzling 
love story. This is, I guess, the op-
eration of what Linda Hutcheon 
calls “irony’s edge”—approvingly 
cited by Huffer in her chapter on 
Diderot’s Nephew. For when I de-
scribed my reading experience of 
this book, in my opening para-
graph, as “maddening,” I was not 
quite aware yet of either the impli-
cations of or the reasons for this 
readerly effect. Having retraversed 
Huffer’s argument in the process 
of writing this review, however, I 
think my sense of un-ease springs 
from the affective dissonance gen-
erated by the “unsettling duplicity” 
of a discourse that effectively in-
vites us to partake in an unraveling 
of all our ideas about ourselves, 
about sexuality, about subjectivity, 
about subjectivation as such. I am 
infinitely more attracted by the 
centrifugal force of madness as de-
subjectivation, as un-becoming, 
however “horrifying” a proposi-
tion it may be, because of the space 
it opens up to think-feel beyond 
the “caged freedom” of subjective 
being, than by the centripetal force 
of an “erotic curiosity of care.” 
What does this say about me? I’ll 
have to think about that a little 
more. What it says about Huffer’s 
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book-event seems to be clear: her 
intense embrace of Madness offers a 
profoundly engaging and unset-
tling roller-coaster ride through 
the founding discourses of not only 
queer theory, but of subjectivity it-
self. one does not have to love 
Foucault to find this exciting—or, 
indeed, deliciously unbecoming.
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